Speaker: Professor Lok-Chi Chan (Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Taiwan University. CEO of the NTU Center for Traditional and Scientific Metaphysics (TSM Center) and the Secretary-General of the Taiwan Association for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology (LMPST Taiwan))

Chair: Professor WANG Wei (Professor, Department of Philosophy and Department of History of Science, School of Humanities, Tsinghua University)

Date: Friday, April 19, 2024

Time: 16:30 - 18:30

Speaker’s info:

Lok-Chi Chan is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Taiwan University; he also current acts as the CEO of the NTU Center for Traditional and Scientific Metaphysics (TSM Center) and the Secretary-General of the Taiwan Association for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology (LMPST Taiwan). His academic focus lies in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion, with a particular emphasis on the philosophical worldview of metaphysical naturalism. His research has been published in leading philosophy journals and volumes including the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Erkenntnis, Ratio, Journal of Consciousness Studies, and Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Abstract:

This article investigates the compatibility between metaphysical naturalism, particularly the notion of "classic naturalism" (as Gallagher calls it) and first-person insights, particularly those offered by phenomenology. By reconstructing and defending classic naturalism, our characterization of which has been informed by the standard works on the topic by Armstrong, Lewis, Jackson, Braddon-Mitchell, Ney, and others, we challenge a common assertion that metaphysical naturalism entails methodological naturalism and demonstrate that these two positions may even conflict. With this in mind, we argue against the renowned phenomenologists Gallagher’s and Zahavi’s call for the need for "non-classic conceptions" when classic naturalism is properly characterized and present evidence supporting the compatibility of phenomenological approaches with metaphysical naturalism. Building upon many contemporary phenomenologists’ notions of mutual constraints (Varela, Roy, Wheeler, Reynolds, Pokropski) and Gallagher’s and Zahavi’s notion of "mutual enlightenment", we propose a refined subtle relationship between naturalism and phenomenology. Finally, having addressed and resolved some standard criticisms of naturalism from phenomenologists, we consider potential ways in which phenomenology can incorporate and adopt the core principles of naturalism from a phenomenological perspective.

Venue: Lecture Hall, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Sciences

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